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1. Introductory remarks 
The  proliferation  of  misinformation,  inaccuracy  in  data  processing,  twisted  scientific  findings
through the web and social media,  in a word the proliferation of “fake news” have raised worries
concerning their alleged impact on democratic processes. For example, events such as Brexit and
Trump’s election are ascribed to the effects of “fake news” on citizens’ choices,  as well as the
xenophobic  attitudes  against  refugees  and  the  mistrust  of  scientific  research.  Deception,  self-
deception, misreading of evidence, biased interpretations of facts, mixed with propaganda and spin
have always been present  in  democratic  politics  and society.  At  first  sight,  what  is  new is  the
multiplying effect of web dissemination as well as a diffuse sense of danger and threat induced by
the denunciation of the unstoppable spreading of false information among citizens and governments
of Western democracy. Despite these worries, which have monopolized media’s attention in the past
couple of years, research on this  subject,  though growing, is  still  in an early stage and mainly
focused on web communications. Yet, the nature of fake news and the reasons why they are so
massively and virally believed require much more digging and theorizing. 
In this paper, I want to tackle this phenomenon by raising two questions. The first concerns
what fake news is, or, to put it differently, whether it is a specific form compared to traditional
public disinformation and deception. More precisely, I shall ask whether the novelty of fake news
lies  just  in  the multiplying  effect  of  the  web and in  the  speed of  dissemination,  or  if  there  is
something more specific to it, linked to the information selection allowed by the web platform and
to the cognitive traps triggered by this means of communication. Incidentally, even if the fake news
phenomenon were only quantitative, the mass of misinformation disseminated by the new media is
such to engender a different scale of risk for democratic and open society. Therefore, even the mere
quantitative dimension of the phenomenon creates a specific new issue for our society.
The second question addresses the issue of fake news from the viewpoint of the recipient or
consumer,  and  asks  on  the  basis  of  which  cognitive  traps  and  mechanisms  cognizers  end  up
believing fake news at a higher and faster rate than true news (Vasoughi et al 2018). Is fake news
believed in the same ways as lies or are there more complex cognitive and motivational elements
factoring  into  coming  to  believe  in  fake  news? A first  immediately  visible  difference  between
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someone duped by a lie and someone duped by fake news is that the latter usually becomes an
active propagator of the false information to large audiences through social media, contributing to
the deception of many other users. 
In the first section of the paper I shall thus take up the discussion on what fake news is and
see whether a specific account can be provided that mark it specifically off compared to traditional
forms of public deception. The relevant deception here is public for fake news typically affects large
audiences and constitutes a public concern for a healthy democracy. In the second section of the
paper, I shall try to map the cognitive and motivational traps making people victims of this form of
disinformation and deception.  Finally,  in  the third section,  I  shall  take up the discussion about
possible remedies, focusing on the ones directed at improving individual epistemic responses to
fake news exposure. There is a lot of discussion about institutional remedies, whether through the
web providers or through political institutions, as well as there is a significant resistance to forms of
political  control  and  censure  of  the  web.  The  issue  of  institutional  control,  however,  must
preliminarily  consider  what  political  values  are  at  stake  and  whether  political  intervention  can
defend them effectively without endangering others. But this work goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Meanwhile, on the issue of cognitive countermeasures, as we shall see, the research is still to
be developed. While there is a number of studies focused on new media communications, and while
there  is  an  important  literature  on  cognitive  and  motivational  distortions  and  bias  and  on  the
epistemology of testimony, there is little work connecting the two and seeing how the findings in
cognitive psychology and in epistemology bear on the fake news belief formation, persistence and
dissemination. I shall try to connect the two literatures and see whether some hints for counteracting
the effect of fake news can be found.
2. What is fake news?
The expression “fake news” was introduced more than a decade ago to connote a special genre of
popular television entertainment, such as the Daily Show, where political satire is embedded in the
humorous reviews of daily news (Holbert 2005). It is a form of reality-based television for the
content  of  the  satire  is  taken from current  political  news.  The satirized reporting  though often
creates ambiguity concerning what is factual and what is fictional, so that the audience must play an
active role in determining the true meaning of the satire. The original sense of the expression, then,
relates to a style of news presentation, uncorrelated to truth, highlighting inconsistencies in political
rhetoric, which might make difficult to viewers to separate satire from facts, truth from fiction. Fake
is more precisely the form in which satire is presented as (inverted) news, while it is up to the
2
audience to decipher the satirical and fictional nature of the show. Some researchers still use “fake
news”  with  reference  to  either  political  satire  (Balmas  2014)  or,  by  extension,  to  the
“tabloidization” of  news as  means of  attention  grabbing and sharable  reporting,  epitomized by
clickbait  headlines (Chen, Conroy, Rubin 2015).   In this  latter  sense,  the sensationalist  form is
responsible for blurring the line between fact and fiction. More specifically, in the case of clickbait
headlines, the indifference towards the truth leads to information whose only purpose is to induce
people to click on a link to a webpage to increase the page views. The content of the message is not
necessarily fiction, but often misleading, unverified and seldom corrected. Fake here is referred to
the fact that clickbait headlines are exaggerated, suggestive, easily misleading, hence represents one
important source of fake news and of its spread.  
In sum, originally, fake news meant something quite different from lies, namely messages
whose fictional nature was wrapped up in a form mimicking reality, leaving the job of drawing the
boundaries  and  decoding  it  in  an  appropriate  way  to  the  individual  recipient.  The  very
categorization of this genre of satirical news as “fake” exploits a line of reflection in experimental
psychology on the effect of (explicit) fiction in inducing beliefs in subjects (Gerring-Prentice 1991,
Gilbert  et  al.  1990,  Marsh-Fazio 2006).  Even if  authors  of fiction do not  aim at  producing an
accurate account of the world, there is a lot of information that readers acquire from fiction. Some
of this information is accurate, and some is instead made up in the fictional story. Experiments have
shown that some of the fictional inaccuracies about the real world go undetected by readers and
come to be encoded in subsequent beliefs, as if the compartimentalization of fiction vs. real world
information were blurred. The integration of fiction and real world sources into self-ascribed beliefs
is apparently less significant when fiction deals with fantastic world remote from daily and familiar
experience. By contrast, when fiction deals with familiar events in a realistic world similar to ours,
the integration is eased, resulting in inaccurate reports of state of facts by the readers (Rapp-Hinze
2014). Hence, a satirical content presented in a form similar to news reportage may well induce
confusion between fiction and reality.
If the original meaning of fake news was thus referred to forms of communication blurring
the boundaries between fiction and real world, and yet not meant to spread false information, the
prevalent  meaning  of  fake-news  is  now  rather  different.  Especially  after  the  2016  American
election, the term has come to mean false stories describing events in the real world by mimicking
the  forms  of  traditional  media  reportages,  fabricated  and  promoted  on  social  media  either  for
ideological reasons or for financial gain (Rubin et al. 2015, Silverman 2016, Mustafaraj-Panagiotis
2017, Alcott-Gentzkow 2017, Rini 2017, Lang-Kim 2017). In this new definition, the following
features characterize fake news: 1. News occurrences are false, being explicitly fabricated by their
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producers, and are not simply the result of mistakes. 2. They are propagated though social media,
implying that they are targeted on large audiences. 3. They are usually motivated either by the wish
to manipulate people’s beliefs in a polarized political context or by the wish to grab attention in
order to increase the clicks on certain links and pages for financial gain. In the latter case, there is
no interest in the doxastic states of the social media consumers, only in inducing a certain behavior
advantageous for the producers. This definition covers both intentionally fabricated news articles,
large scale hoaxes,  and humorous fakes, i.e,  articles originated in satirical  websites that can be
misunderstood as factual, especially if viewed out of context on Twitter or Facebook. Moreover, it
is agnostic concerning the intentional deception component in fake news. Some authors in fact hold
that  intentional  deception  is  one  of  its  characterizing  features  (Rine  2017,  Lang-Kim  2017,
Mustafaraj-Panagiotis 2017), while others do not take side on the matter (Alcott-Gentzkow 2017,
Vosoughi et al. 2018). I think that the intentional deception component is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for fake news. We have seen that some fake news is motivated by financial
gain, while some others depend on the consumer’s inability to understand humorous jokes as such.
Hence, not all instances of fake news are prompted by the intention to deceive the social media
users into believing something that is false but in the interest of the liar to have them believe.
Moreover, I suspect that those scholars who underline the intention to deceive conflate the fact that
the information passed on is false and the producer is aware of this fact with the explicit intention of
deceiving others. The two things must be set apart for in the first case the deception usually occurs
but simply as a by-product of passing on false information for other reasons, while in the second
case the deception of others is the outcome of a deliberate strategy of lying. True, some fake news
information, notably the ones with political content, is deliberately created and disseminated aiming
at the manipulation of beliefs and behavior of citizens. In this respect, political manipulation by
fake  news  seems  to  be  no  different  from  traditional  political  manipulation  via  politicians’
statements, apart from the social media effect of multiplying and speeding up dissemination. But
this similarity concerns only a section of fake news and, even in this section, evidence coming from
current research shows that there are specific features setting political fake news apart from old
propaganda and manipulation. On the one hand, as many scholars hold, internet and social media
seem to affect the selection process of the information one is exposed to (Sunstein 2007, Pariser
2011,  Mustafaraj-Panagiotis  2017),  and,  on  the  other  hands,  cognitive  traps,  heuristics  and
motivational interference are more easily triggered in social media contexts (Levy 2017). Moreover,
there  are  consequences  of  the  spreading  of  fake  news,  such as  their  agenda  setting  power  on
traditional media and public discourse (Vargo 2018). 
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In other  words,  current  research has  successfully  shown a)  that  there  are  some specific
features of the platform’s algorithms allowing producers of fake news to find the people likely to
disseminate the false news, and b) that the dissemination is parasitic on cognitive features of users.
Fake news producers exploit the technological possibilities of the platforms to reach potentially
sensitive  users  (Mustafaraj-Panagiotis  2017),  while  clickbait  headlines  exploit  the  proneness  to
attention grabbing cues of human minds (Chen, Conroy, Rubin 2015).
So far, we have seen that “fake news” can be characterized as something specific compared
to  traditional  political  deception  and propaganda,  with  reference  to:  1)  How the  false  news  is
fabricated,  posted,  and  disseminated  through  social  media  and  research  engines.  2)  How  the
dimension of misinformation,  due to the size of the affected audiences and to the speed of the
dissemination is incomparable with traditional forms. 3) How it comes to be believed by the social
media users. 3) How it powerfully affects the agenda setting in the public discourse of a society.   
Despite the possibility of a specific characterization of fake news, some researchers doubt that the
expression represents a useful notion for analytical purpose. The ideological use of the concept,
now  habitually  employed  polemically  to  criticize  and  reject  unfavorable  political  information,
seems to discourage its adoption in a more analytical context. Whatever negative information comes
about in the public forum about any politician or party, it is now commonly rejected as fake news,
as  intentionally  planted  falsehood  to  discredit  him or  her,  apparently  without  need  to  provide
evidence  for  the  allegation.  This  partisan  and  symmetrical  use  of  fake  news  to  reject  critical
information about oneself or one’s party has the effect of wrapping political discourse in a fog
where truths and fabrications are mixed together, leading some commentators to speak about the
present as a regime of post-truth (Manjoo 2008). For this reason, some researchers have grown
suspicious  of  using  the  expression  in  scholarly  analysis,  and now they prefer  to  substitute  the
expression with  false  news and information vs.  true news and information (Vosoughi, Roy, Aral
2018). While I understand their qualms, I think that fake news better conveys the specificity of this
novel form of misinformation compared to traditional false information. Hence, I shall stick to the
expression fake news, aware of the misuse in partisan politics, but also confident that conceptual
analysis can dispel the fog.
3. Why do we believe fake news?
The question why we do believe in fake news may appear otiose, for we believe fake news in the
same ways as  we believe  true  information.  Experimental  psychology has  actually  validated  an
intuition  by  Spinoza  concerning  belief  formation  while  understanding  a  message:  as  Spinoza
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claimed, evidence supports that while understanding a piece of information we accept it as true, and
maybe later we come to disbelieve it (Gilbert, Krull, Malone 1990). This experiment gives primacy
to  believing  information  as  true  rather  than  suspending  judgment.   One  usual  way  of  getting
information is through testimony and, as a rule, we believe information by testimony, if there are no
reasons either  to  mistrust  the  testifier  or  to  doubt  the  content  of  the  information  that  is  either
incoherent or at odds with our system of beliefs.1 A recent paper has actually argued that from the
point  of  view  of  the  epistemology  of  testimony,  believing  in  fake  news  is  often  individually
reasonable (Rini 2017). Despite the relationship between testifier and testimony is in the case of
social media more ambiguous, nevertheless people mainly treat social media transmission as if it
were a normal form of testimony. Even though, according to Rini, social media transmission is a
form of bent testimony that should make us more cautious before accepting the information as true,
nevertheless certain conditions in the use of social media make the acceptance of testimony through
them subjectively reasonable. That is because social media news often concerns political matters
and,  to  be  precise,  highly  polarized  political  messages.  If,  as  Rina  claims,  partisanship  is  not
epistemically  unreasonable,  then  it  follows  that  accepting  partisan  testimony  transmission  is
compatible with epistemic virtues. For this reason, she concludes that believing fake news with a
political partisan content, all in all, is not subjectively unreasonable.  I shall not discuss this claim
now. I only refer to this argument in order to show that the question of why we believe in fake news
may appear otiose prima facie, given that not only we believe in testimony as a default, but also that
there are good subjective reasons to believe in the form of bent testimony represented by social
media.
Yet, despite the fact that accepting fake news may be judged in line with the epistemology of
testimony, the question of why we do believe in fake news is not otiose,  given that recent research
has established that fake news is spread on social media more broadly, rapidly and in a deeper way
than  true  news  (Vosoughi  et  al.  2018).   This  work,  based  on the  analysis  of  Twitter  from its
beginning to 2017, confirms the finding of another research, which instead examined Facebook
news during the final three months of the US presidential campaign in 2016, “The analysis shows
how viral fake election news stories outperformed real ones on Facebook” (Silverman 2016). Both
researches actually measure the spread of fake news, and not the beliefs resulting from it, but, as we
shall  see more properly below, beliefs are a  function of their  diffusion and, even if  not all  re-
tweeters are in fact believers in the news content, a good number of them supposedly are. If we are
to infer, then, that the social media induce false beliefs at higher rate than true beliefs, why we do
believe in fake news is far from being an otiose question.
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Going back to the findings of the Vosoughi research, the authors looked for an explanation
of the superior capacity of penetration of falsehoods; hence, they firstly tested the conventional
wisdom  according  to  which  the  spreading  of  fake  news  is  explained  by  the  structure  of
communication and by individual variances. In other words, the conventional wisdom attributes
these results on the different –longer or shorter-- presence of people on Twitter, on their being more
or less active, having more or less contacts and so on. But Vosoughi and his colleagues found there
this  explanation  has  no  grounds.  For  alternative  answers,  they  subsequently  looked  out  at
information  theory  and  Bayesian  decision  theory,  and  hypothesized  that  novelty  might  be  an
important key factor for news spreading. Novelty has not only a grabbing attention power, but it is
more valuable for it provides new information and grounds for decision making, as well as for
social factors. The provider of new information acquires a higher social status as the one who is “in
the know”.  Since fake news usually contain new and striking information, given their attention
grabbing  nature,  novelty  could  represent  the  relevant  cue.  The  novelty  hypothesis  was  in  fact
confirmed by a check on subjects’ previous exposure to fake vs. true information, as well as by a
check on the emotion displayed in the re-tweeting. For fake news, the prevalent emotions were
surprise and then disgust, which corroborate the hypothesis that fake news typically transmits new
and surprising information.  Thus,  the cue priming re-tweeting has nothing to do with the truth
credentials of the news. As said above, this very important research concerns the diffusion of news
on  social  media,  and  more  specifically  on  Twitter,  by  checking  the  rumor  cascades  from any
original tweet, whether true or false. It does not advance any claim about beliefs.  Retweeting is not
equivalent to endorse and believing the information one is transmitting.  The difference between the
two has to do with the uncertainty of the norms of communication governing social media,  even if,
despite ambiguity in testimonial intentions, it seems that above a certain threshold of sharing, any
ambiguity  seem  to  be  washed  away  and  people  take  the  sharing  as  a  form  of  endorsing  the
transmitted claim (Rini 2017).  
The relationship between news spreading and correspondent beliefs formation deserves to be
analyzed more closely for it may help to respond to our question. In general, a precondition for a
piece of news to be believed is to reach out to people, and, in that sense, the broader and faster
spreading of fake news increases the probability of its being believed. Yet, given that retweeting
does not imply believing the news, we can speculate here that the reasons or causes for retweeting
can be different from of the reasons or causes of coming to believe the news. The novelty of the
message, as suggested in the research above, grabs the attention and surprises the user, which, in
turn, motivates her to retweet the message. The correspondent belief can at this point more easily be
formed, even if at the beginning the subject was unsure about the truth of the message, on the basis
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of two different mechanisms described by cognitive psychology. One is predicted by perception
theory, that is the tendency to infer belief from behavior, or, to put it differently to use behavior as a
sign of the correspondent belief, justifying the behavior ex post (Bem 1967, Bem et al. 1970). In
this sense, retweeting may be taken as revealing the correspondent belief justifying the action of
spreading the message. The second consists in the effect on fluency processing of information, so
that a more easily retrievable stimulus affects what people come to believe (Alter 2007, Rapp et al.
2014). Suppose that the retweeting user is originally agnostic about the claim of the message. Yet
retweeting exposes the user twice to the same message, and if the dissemination proceeds, there is a
good chance that the same claim may reach the user by a different cascade, and furthermore by the
claim being reported on traditional media. Repeated exposure facilitates familiarity and the fluency
processing,  which,  in  turn,  induces  the  correspondent  belief,  just  because  the  retrieval  of  the
information is easier and more readily available (fluent). The fluency effect strikes automatically,
even if, originally, one had doubts about that piece of information, and it may be activated by the
salience and simplicity of the message, as well as by repetition and familiarity. It may seem that
novelty and familiarity are going in opposite directions concerning their effect on belief, and that
the one should limit the effect of the other. In fact, in the dissemination of fake news, the two,
apparently opposite, cues for fluency processing are likely to work together.  The novelty arouses
attention  and  emotion  of  surprise,  which  make  the  message  salient  and  the  subjects  prone  to
suggestibility (Eslik, Fazio, Marsh 2011). Then, retweeting is a repetition, which is likely to be only
the first,  for the message can reach the user through other cascades and from traditional media
commenting on it. This increases familiarity as well as the perception that the information is shared
and held by others, reinforcing the belief in it being true.   
 Both  self-perception  and  fluency  processing  work  below  the  radar  of  awareness  and
analytical reasoning, and strike anyone, in the appropriate context. I like to stress the difference
between the two mechanisms.  Self-perception is a distorted form of self-attribution of beliefs ex-
post  based on actual  behavior,  which has been interpreted as  a form of  reduction of  cognitive
dissonance (Festinger 1957); by contrast, fluency processing is a heuristics, a process speeding our
cognitive process bypassing epistemic rules, which, under the appropriate circumstances, produces
reliable judgments open to epistemic justification (Reber, Unkelbach 2014).2 Yet, heuristics can as
well  lead to  wrong conclusion in the unfavorable circumstances.   The consideration of fluency
processing shows that,  even if  the  media user  is  relatively  sophisticated  epistemically,  and not
immediately duped by the fake news, the latter may automatically affect his doxastic state at a later
time, just because of the repeated exposition and to the action of retweeting (Levy 2017).  In sum,
even though the researches by Silverman and by Vosoughi and al. concern the spreading of fake
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news, the broader and faster rate of spreading is likely to induce an increase of correspondent false
beliefs, given certain cognitive mechanisms.
The reason why fake news is believed is thus firstly correlated to certain cognitive features,
amply  analyzed  by  cognitive  psychology,  which  are  displayed  in  all  sorts  of  acquisition  and
retrieval of knowledge, but which are especially triggered by the working of social media. That is
because not only the news on social media are presented in a simplified, but grabbing attention
form, but also because they tend to spread rapidly and to come back from multiple paths to social
media  users  so as  to  induce familiarity,  hence  enhancing fluency processing.  Beside these  two
features of news circulation on line and on social media, another factor affecting the credibility of
information is its general acceptance by others. The larger the number of people believing that P
affects the tendency to acquire and share the belief that P. Now it is unclear whether the influence of
a popular view on our doxastic system belongs to the same kind of automated mechanisms above
described or  not,  for  the fact  that  a  belief  is  shared  among other  people  is  often a  reasonable
corroboration of its truth (Schwarz and al. 2016). If however other grounds justifying the belief are
lacking, accepting a belief as true because it is largely popular may be a display of conformity bias.
Clearly,  the  multiplying  effect  of  social  media  largely  amplifies  this  tendency,  contributing  in
making believe falsehoods as true facts. Evidence shows that, when a view is held by people with
whom we identify, the influence on our doxastic system is especially powerful (Del Vicario et al.
2015; Levy 2017). 
This phenomenon leads me to consider the motivational interference in the acquisition of
information, as a relevant cause of misinformation, and the effect of partisanship and ideology, as
sources of specific form of motivated false beliefs. I define partisan viewpoints “ideological”, if
they work as screens for selecting information, blocking out the adverse news, and prompting the
acceptance  of  favorable  ones.  Much  research  done  on  political  misinformation  either  through
politicians and old media or through new media confirms the effect of partisanship in accepting or
rejecting certain news, according to whether its source is one’s party or more generally one’s side or
not (Cohen 2003; Uhlman, et al. 2009, Silverman 2016, Piacenza 2018).  However, relative little
reflection is available on the different components contributing to the effect of ideological views on
beliefs.   I  argue that  relying on ideology as selector  of information embodies:  1) a  reasonable
component; 2) a fluency processing component and 3) a motivational component influencing the
belief  formation.  The reasonable component  has been argued for by Rini  (2017),  in  the article
previously  discussed.   If  someone  holds  a  comprehensive  view of  politics  and  society,  and  is
genuinely convinced it to be true, she shares a special bond and trust with the people sharing the
same worldview. As much as one trusts the testimony of a trustworthy friend, similarly, one tends to
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trust information coming from the party or the group sharing the same comprehensive view, for that
makes them trustworthy. In that respect, believing information coming from the party or group that
one trusts is in general reasonable, at least if the content of the news fits with what one knows about
the world and is consistent with one’s other beliefs. However, and that is precisely one of the fake
news feature, the content of the information passed on via social media is often outrageous and
striking, has sometimes the character of a hoax, or of satire. Think of the infamous news spread
during  the  last  US  presidential  campaign  against  Hillary  Clinton,  concerning  the  use  of  the
basement of a pizza parlor in Washington, for pedophile activities (Cush 2016). This is tipically the
kind of information that should makes anyone who has previous information about Hilary Clinton
to be dubious of its veracity, no matter whether one liked her politically or not, and whether the
news source  comes  from one’s  party.  Nevertheless,  the  news  was widely  believed by Trump’s
supporters who willingly contributed to its spread on social media. In such a case, which is far from
being isolated in the dissemination of political falsehoods on social media, there is no reasonable
justification to believe the information, even from the subjective viewpoint of a partisan. Lacking
reasonable justification, external cues may perhaps explain the belief formation. Such information is
new, surprising and attention grabbing: such features contribute to make it salient, and, in turn,
salience triggers fluency processing. This kind of news arouses attention and emotional responses of
both surprise and disgust, as reported by Vasoughi’s research, and sticks to one’s memory much
more than mundane pieces of facts. Partisan misinformation through social media are especially fit
to elicit such cognitive responses. However, if the reason of believing such an incredible news were
just fluency processing, that is, a “cold” cognitive mechanism, how come the believers were all
Trump’s supporters? Fluency should strike indiscriminately either conservatives or liberals. This
consideration leads me to consider the motivational component as crucial,  which,  in case,  may
trigger the fluency processing component. Evidence of the motivational component is abundant in
all  studies  on  political  polarization.  Motivated  irrationality  is  a  well  know  area  of  study  in
epistemology and philosophy of mind. It has mostly concentrated on two specimens, namely self-
deception and wishful-thinking. The analysis of motivated irrationality has also been applied to
ideology, under the strictly Marxian notion of false consciousness (Elster 1983). Now I propose to
extend  the  motivated  irrationality  analysis  to  ideological  convictions  in  a  broader  sense,  as
comprehensive worldviews, which people not only believe as true, but with which they also identify
themselves.  In  general,  if  we  firmly  hold  a  worldview,  we  are  inclined  to  believe  any  news
consistent and fitting into that view. The “consistency push” is neither irrational nor necessarily
motivational: actually, among the criteria for evaluating whether a belief can be accepted as true,
one is precisely its consistency with the other beliefs one holds, and another is the coherence of the
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content of the information (Schwarz et al. 2016). Yet, we have seen that in case of fake news, such
checks are usually suspended when the misinformation comes from the group or party sharing our
worldview,  despite  the fact  that  its  content  is  unfitting the world as we know it.  In front  of  a
preposterous news, such as the pizzagate and Hilary Clinton, what makes people believe it cannot
be the consistency push. We must rather presupposing a wish to believe information favorable to
one’s party as the push for partisans to believe something without warrant and despite good sense.
Obviously, ideology has always worked in this way much before fake news were circulating on line,
and  contributed  to  people’s  holding  falsehoods.  What  is  new  now  is  the  quantity  of  partisan
information spread through social media and coming back to research engines on the web and on
traditional media and the preposterous nature of fake news claims. In turn, the false beliefs seem to
be immune from correction and new evidence. 
This observation leads me to a final issue, which represents a major concern for the effect of
fake news, that is, the resistance to corrections: even in case of subsequent exposure to new and
compelling evidence against the fake news, subjects tend to retain their false belief in line with their
ideological views, despite debunking.  When a subject believes that P according to her wish but
against available evidence,  this  is  precisely a case of self-deception.  The fact that once formed
beliefs seem immunized to new evidence and new arguments is widely reported in many researches
in experimental psychology and political psychology (Gilbert, Krull, Malone 1990; Marsh, Fazio
2006;  Neylan,  Reifler  2010;  Eslik,  Fazio,  Marsh 2011;  Lewandowsky et  al.  2012,  Peter,  Koch
2016).  Furthermore, some experiments have proved that the attempt of debunking fake news with
evidence and arguments often have the backfire effect of reinforcing the false belief.  Strangely
enough, this kind of research has never considered the work done in the area of self-deception, both
by epistemologists,  philosophers  of mind and by experimental psychologists,  for I  think that  it
might have helped to made a clearer sense not only of the resistance to corrections but also of the
backfire effect.
The backfire effect has been especially investigated by Neylan and Reifler (2010). They
precisely  tested  participants  by exposing to  information  contradicting  their  political  beliefs  and
opinions, for example exposing them to negative information relative to their preferred candidate.
This is a case where, in order to preserve one’s political conviction, a careful selective search of
information, to the effect of filtering out all data contradicting one’s convictions, is not sufficient.
The biased search strategy is actually one of the typical mental activity displayed by self-deceivers
to defend their favorite belief that P against threatening evidence. In this case, though, the negative
evidence has been put in front of the participants’ eye, and in order to defend that P is not sufficient
to look away and filter out the evidence for ~P. The account of persisting in a false belief cannot
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simply refer to the fact that people believe what they want believe, as the authors of this research
pointed out. On the one hand, we cannot believe by fiat, and, on the other, if that were possible,
humans would live in a delusional world and that would be extremely dangerous for their own
survival. In fact, most of the time we hold beliefs appropriately, whether formed by heuristics or by
expressed reasoning. This is what makes so puzzling the phenomenon of self-deceptive beliefs, that
is, false motivated beliefs held in the teeth of evidence. Thus how come the participants of the
experiment were directly exposed to information contrary to their belief, and nevertheless, not only
retain their belief, but also became more firm in their conviction? In this case, in order to defend the
belief that P, the subjects must either explain away the contrary evidence or block the inference
from  the  contrary  evidence  to  ~P.  Either  way,  the  subjects  must  engage  in  sophisticated
counterarguments to avoid concluding that ~P, either questioning the credibility of the information,
or its relevance for the judgment on their preferred candidate.  Since the negative evidence does not
directly compel one to believe ~P, there is always a little latitude for engaging in arguments, twisted
and yet  sophisticated,  leading to  the self-deceptive belief  that P.  This finding actually confirms
researches and studies on self-deception (Wentura, Greve, 2003, Wentura, Greve, 2005, Michael,
Neuwen, 2010) where it is apparent that the persistence of a counter-evidential belief according to
one’s wish is brought about by a whole host of arguments displaying a quasi-rationality. As a result
of such argumentative activity, subjects end up even firmer in their convictions. 
In  sum,  not  only  ideological  convictions  contribute  to  make  fake  news  believed  in
accordance with one’s ideological outlook, but they motivate partisan people to hold on to their
preferred beliefs even when contrary evidence becomes available, and may even induce backfire
effect. Making use of the work on motivated irrationality, we can say that ideological motivations
lowers accuracy, manipulating the acceptance threshold in processing information concerning one’s
ideological outlook (Mele 2001). The positive information is therefore immediately and fluently
processed  to  form  the  favorable  belief  that  P.  In  case  of  welcoming  stimuli,  the  ideological
motivation  triggers  subintentional  mechanisms  directly  producing  the  belief  that  P thanks  to  a
lowered  acceptance  threshold.  This  is  usually  how  wishful  thinking,  that  is  believing  beyond
evidence and in accordance with one’s wishes, comes about. The negative information, by contrast,
primes a self-deceptive process, for self-deception is precisely believing something according to
one’s wish and against the evidence. But, while wishful thinking is brought about directly by the
working  of  subintentional  cognitive  mechanism triggered  by  the  wish,  self-deception  is  set  in
motion by the threatening negative evidence and the emotionally loaded wish to believe that P, in
case of costs of accuracy sinking or discounting (Galeotti 2018). The last condition is important to
sort out the selectivity issue of self deception, namely the fact that self-deception does not strike all
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the times reality  frustrates our desires (Talbot 1995, Bermudez 2000).  Incidentally,  Neylan and
Reifler indirectly referred to selectivity, when they pointed out that the backfire effect cannot be
explained by the fact  that  people believe what  they want.  Self-deception cannot  be the default
response whenever information run counter our preferences. In front of the negative evidence, the
rational response would be to act so as to counteract the threat and bring about the desired state of
the world. However, sometimes action is precisely foreclosed by the circumstances, or it is too
costly, or, in any case, the consequences do not befall on the agent. This circumstance leads to the
sinking or discounting the costs of inaccuracy, lowering the threshold of evidence for believing
something true and heightening the threshold to disbelieving it.  Let us apply this  model to the
ideological  backfire  effect  in  front  of  debunking.   The  person  holding  certain  ideological
convictions  is  actually  powerless  to  counteract  the  negative  information  she  is  exposed;  the
discomfort induced by the bad news cannot be undone with an accurate processing of data. In a
word, for her there is nothing to gain by epistemic accuracy, only to increase her discomfort and
uneasiness. Thus,  the circumstances favorable for a self-deception process are all  in place.  The
subject at this point starts thinking how to reject the negative evidence and to go on holding one’s
cherished conviction. The motivated reasoning is affected by biases in data treatment, so that when
the subject has found an explanation washing away the negative evidence, she can stop and go on
holding what accords with her favored view. Since the subject must produce arguments to dismiss
the negative data, the process embodies explicit reasoning that, though twisted, biased and below
standards, does not proceed randomly. 
One of the reasons why the reference to the motivated irrationality literature is important
concerns the understanding of the motivation underlying the stickiness of ideological convictions.
To be sure, lots of research has been done on the persistence of errors in experimental and political
psychology, mostly testing interference of inaccurate information with memory retrieval. However,
these experiments are designed to highlight the effect of external cues,  fluency processing,  and
other subintentional mechanisms in the difficulty of correction of mistakes, clearly not considering
the very possibility of motivational interference. I argue, however, that the motivational influence is
crucial  to  make  sense  of  cognitive  phenomena  which  otherwise  would  look  contradictory,  for
example  the  phenomenon  of  “Blind  choice”  which  seems  to  go  opposite  to  the  stickiness  of
erroneous  beliefs.  The  blind  choice  phenomenon  emerges  in  experimental  contexts  where  the
participants are asked to express their agreement with certain statements, and then, through a subtle
manipulation of the experiment sheets, are asked to justify their own answers, some of which have
been reversed by the experimenters. Many participants do not realize the manipulation, and take the
answers written down as their own, hence proceed in justifying them. The blind choice experiments
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are  deliberately  designed  to  test  ascription  theory,  namely  the  tendency  to  infer  beliefs  from
behavior ex post, and the interpretation of the irrational shift in beliefs is provided by the reduction
of cognitive dissonance, in direction of internal consistency. This experiment, however, must be
considered in a larger context to be realigned with the findings on the persistence of mistaken belief
and the difficulty of correction. It is doubtful that the drive to consistency is purely cognitive and
has nothing to do with the sense of self and the desire to save face. The strange behavior of people
who argue in favor of viewpoints that earlier on they have explicitly rejected, more than proving
that they self-attribute certain beliefs from their written responses, to my mind, proves that they
want to avoid embarrassment. My interpretation find confirmation in another experiment on the
phenomenon of blind choice reported by Neil Levy (2017): the experiment asks participants to write
an essay supporting a view running counter their preferences, namely that university fees should be
raised. The participants were divided into three groups: one was given financial incentives, one was
asked to volunteer to do the task, and the third was the control group left free to support either
views on the issue. As expected, the control group wrote against the raise of university fees; the
others instead followed the instruction. Yet, when asked to expand on their essay, the group who
received financial incentives had no difficulty in saying that they wrote the essay for money without
believing what they argued. The group of volunteers instead defended their essay and endorsed the
argument they wrote following the instruction but against their preference. The explanation in terms
of self-ascription theory does not seem completely convincing. To my mind, it was not that they
inferred their preferences from what they wrote, driven by need of internal consistency, but rather
by the wish to defend their integrity, since they felt uneasy and ashamed about having volunteered
to  switch  their  positions,  and in  order  to  preserve  their  integrity  they  ended  up endorsing  the
disliked  thesis.  This  irrational  shift  of  positions  concerned  more  their  moral  consistency,  the
integrity of their own self, rather than merely their logical or epistemic consistency. Such a problem
did not affect the group payed to write the essay for they had an external reason to sustain a thesis
contrary to their conviction and their moral integrity was not stained by their response to the task.
The  defense  of  one’s  image  and  identity  is  the  same  motivation  underlying  the  motivated
irrationality induced by ideological convictions: the endorsement of an ideology defines people’s
identity and self-image. The negative information threatening the robustness of ideology is at the
same time a threat  on one’s self-image as sharing that  view and on the group with which one
identify himself: no one likes to be associated with political corruption and illicit behavior. Hence,
the resistance to corrections, though may well be eased by the presence of implicit or automated
cognitive mechanisms, is triggered by the desire to defend one’s image and the image of the group
with  which  one  identifies.  In  this  respect,  the  motivational  and  the  cognitive  component  are
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integrated:  desires  are  triggers  of  cognitive  implicit  and  subintentional  mechanisms  leading  to
believing or persisting to believing that P. When the subject is confronted with negative evidence,
the  subintentional  mechanisms  are  supplemented  by explicit,  though biased,  reasoning  arguing
against the negative evidence. 
Such cognitive distortions,  motivated and non-motivated alike,  are  actually spread in  all
forms  of  communication,  interpersonal,  public,  through  old  or  new  social  media.  As  already
mentioned,  the  specificity  of  fake  news  spread  on  social  media  concerns:  1)  the  quantity  of
messages and information one is exposed; 2) the way news on social media are fabricated to convey
simple, striking, even outrageous messages leading people to disseminate; 3) the enhancement of
fluency, given the form of the message and its repetition.  Concerning specifically political news,
then, many scholars have advanced the worry on the increase of polarization. As effect of social
media, citizens not only come to hold more false beliefs in line with their ideology, not only resist
correction, but tend to be more ideologically segregated and more polarized, making bleaker the
chances  for a  healthy democracy (Abramowitz,  Saunders,  2008).   The effect  of new media on
polarization  had  first  been  denounced  by  Cass  Sunstein,  at  the  beginning  of  the  millennium
(Sunstein 2001, 2007). He was especially worried by the unlimited filtering of information allowed
by web, which would virtually produce the echo-chambers effect where consumers only listen to
themselves. The segregation effect is further increased by the working of web-platforms, which
propose users contents of their liking, based on previous choices (Del Vicario, et al 2015, Flaxman
et al. 2016).  A healthy democracy would instead require that citizens were exposed to a large range
of opinions in order to form political views through a balanced and informed inquiry of issues and
candidates.  Much  subsequent  research,  however,  have  shown  that  the  worries  about  political
segregation via the web and especially social media are largely exaggerated (Gentzkow, Shapiro
2011; Bakshy, Messing, Adamic 2015). These researches pointed out that internet and social media
are far less segregated than networks of trusted friends.  To my knowledge, there is however no
research on polarization specifically, hence so far, the hypothesis that news passed on social media
and the  internet  induce  a  greater  polarization  is  reasonable,  given  the  nature  of  the  messages.
Moreover, the repeated effect at debunking certain fakes by general media may induce in partisans
the backfire effect above analyzed, contributing to strengthen increasingly polarized positions.
4. What is to be done?
Neil Levy in his article “The Bad News about Fake News”(2017) projects a very bleak view on the
possibility of changing the communicative landscape so as to free our society and polity from fake
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news.  We usually tend to think that fake news dupes unsophisticated people, typically “others” with
respect to the groups we identify with.  This third-person effect of fake news has actually been
detected and analyzed: people perceive the effect of fake news as being greater on outer political
groups than on themselves or on their own group (Lang, Kim 2018). Clearly, such perception is
deceptive, yet it is reasonable to think that fake news does not affect everyone in the same way.
Levy’s argument is instead meant to counter the common idea that sophisticated social agents may
be immunized against fake news. He claims that the danger implicit in fake news is not just caused
by the difficulty to detect and debunk them, but also by the mere fact of being exposed to them.
Experimental psychological work on fiction (Gerring, Fazio 1991; Marsh, Fazio, 2006; Rapp, Hinze
2014), as we have mentioned, shows that even when people know that they are reading or viewing
fictional works, the latter leave representations in their mind, subsequently retrievable by memory
and often giving rise to beliefs, in case related beliefs are not stable and clear. In sum, there is no
way to escape from fake news and the related dangers, according to him. If one is easily taken in by
them, then, as we have seen, she is likely to resist corrections and to become more convinced as a
result of the backfire effect. If one is sophisticated and epistemically cautious so that she is not
easily duped by misinformation, she is in any case exposed and repeatedly, given the fake news
agenda power in traditional media and the public forum.  Such repeated exposures increase the
chances  to  end up believing what  she  knew from start  being  false.  In  a  word,  Levy precisely
projects a world of post-truth where our reasoning capability and epistemic virtues are at loss in the
fight against misinformation. Similar conclusion is reached by a different argument also by Rini
(2017): if believing fake news is subjectively reasonable in many circumstances, then, she argues
that we cannot rely on epistemic virtues to fight falsehood. That is why she advocates institutional
measures, which seem the only possible conclusion from Levy’s view.  However, as said, I do not
intend to open the Pandora box of the institutional measures, whether concerning web-platform or
politics,  because,  to start,  we should have preliminarily clear what are the values and rights to
protect here. Assuming we have epistemic rights (Watson 2018), how can such rights be enforced,
and does not the enforcement risk infringing on other rights? These complex questions deserve to
be dealt with at length. For this reason, I shall now confine myself to consider measures at the level
of the individual epistemic subject.
In this respect, I would start by saying that the danger of mere exposition to fake news has
been greatly exaggerated by Levy: exposition may facilitate the formation of a correspondent belief,
but only in a second time and only in case the subject is not certain about his beliefs on that matter.
Otherwise, all of us would believe anything that comes in our way and, as a result, we would all
share the same beliefs, instead of being polarized on controversial information.  Moreover, despite
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the emphasis on automated and implicit processes in bringing about false beliefs, on the base of
suggestibility, repetition, familiarity, fluency memory retrieval, cognitive psychology also provides
some guidelines to counter the misinformation effect on beliefs. A first interesting suggestion comes
from a research aimed at blocking the fluency effect in belief formation (Alter et al. 2007). The
authors have found that when subjects experiences metacognitive difficulty in activating fluency
processing, they activate instead analytic forms of reasoning that assess, and in case correct, the
output of more intuitive form of processing information.  In other words,  facilitating disfluency
helps  setting in  motion explicit  forms of  reasoning leading to  a  more critical  validation of the
received  information.  The  finding  is  undoubtedly  interesting,  yet  the  problem  is  how  such
disfluency can be induced outside the lab, and especially in users of social media. A different kind
of suggestion derives from a research specifically on validation of information (Richter et al. 2008).
This  research  tested  the  hypothesis  of  a  fast-track  validation  system  interacting  with
comprehension,  and  activated  in  early  stages  of  information  processing,  based  on  background
knowledge. Contrary to the thesis according to which the acceptance of information is primary and
implicit in comprehension while the epistemic validation, if at all, comes later (Gilbert et al. 1990),
and is slow and costly, the researchers provide evidence that the validation takes place at the same
time as  comprehension,  and is  a  fast,  routinized  process  relying  on the  cognizer’s  background
knowledge. This validation modality, called epistemic monitor, actually checks the inconsistencies
in the incoming information vis-à-vis what we know of the world, and represents an efficient filter
to detect falsehoods and deception. Thus, we are in principle endowed with a system allowing us to
believe only what is in line with epistemic validation: how come then are we so easily duped by
fake news? The experiment shows that the epistemic monitor works efficiently only if the cognizer
has  the  relevant  background  knowledge:  in  the  opposite  case,  as  it  happens  with  medical
information, the subject is not able to detect falsity and is actually prone to believe the news to
which she has been exposed. Here we have an important hint, namely that the more people are
educated and knowledgeable,  the less they can be victim of misinformation.  This consideration
actually correlates with findings in political psychology: the more educated the people,  the less
prone to believe in fake news (pace Levy).  The finding is not unexpected, and some more definite
suggestions may be inferred concerning the areas where misinformation is especially widespread
and publicly dangerous, namely politics and science. Some researches on political polarization have
actually found that more worrisome than polarization is the widespread ignorance among citizens
about political facts (Bullock et al. 2015). 
In conclusion, we seems to know quite a lot about how we are duped by fake news, but
relatively little about how to fortify our epistemic capacities, though knowing that we are endowed
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with an epistemic monitor  is  reassuring.   A different  path  to  avoid  cognitive  traps  is  to  adopt
strategies of pre-commitment, that is, strategies providing external constraints compelling us to be
more accurate cognizers.3 In a way, such strategies implement the idea to create disfluency in order
to provide a warning flag activating explicit and analytical reasoning. For example, the symbols
used by Facebook to alert of the possible inaccurate claim of a certain news can be seen as a form of
pre-commitment.  It is clear though that in order to work such kind of strategy presupposes the
acknowledgment of the problem and the willingness to overcome it. And, in that respect, cultivating
epistemic virtues and being convinced of one’s epistemic rights may be the first crucial step.
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1 The evaluation of the truth of a statement can count on five criteria: 1) general acceptance by other people;
2) gauging of the available evidence; 3) compatibility of the other beliefs; 4) general coherence of the 
statement; 5) credibility of the source (Schwarz et al. 2016). In case of belief by testimony, criterion (2) does 
not apply, but all other four are actually available.
2 I shall refer to heuristic and implicit modes of belief acquisition without taking side in the controversy over 
the dual process of reasoning or the unified process of reasoning. The supporters of the dual process 
envisage two different strategy of learning, one based on intuition, making use of heuristics, fast and often 
unreliable; the second, based on analytical thinking, much slower, but under control, and epistemically 
adequate (Alter et al. 2007; Schwarz et al. 2016). The supporters of a unified process of learning think of a 
continuum of different strategies in knowledge acquisition and retrieval, some of which are implicit and quick,
some other are slower and explicit, and some are automated after many repetition (Osman 2004). For the 
purpose of this paper, the relevant fact is the supports of either theory acknowledge that acquisition and 
retrieval of knowledge can proceed by implicit or automated processed, below the radar of awareness, and 
by explicit analytical thinking modules.
3 Precommitment has been analyzed by Jon Elster (1979), as the strategy to counter weakness of the will by
binding oneself at a time t¹, in condition of cognitive lucidity, to avoid at time t², under emotional pressure, to 
fall prey of a behavior against one’s better judgment. Pre-commitment is symbolized in the sory of Ulysses 
who made himself bound to the ship mast before being exposed to the sirens ‘s fatal singing, hence avoiding
to jump off the board.
